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NOTES AND COMMENT
SOME AsPECTs oF TRUST Accu ruLATioNs IN NEw YORK
In 1894 the New York Court of Appeals settled the rule that a
trust of real property to pay a specified annuity each year to the bene-
ficiary was valid as within the spirit, if not the letter, of the statute
permitting trusts.1 Since that time it has become popular among
those who wish to provide for the support of another after death,
but lack faith in the business ability of the beneficiary, to create a
trust of either real or personal property from which a stated annuity
is to be paid each year. Usually the provision for the payment of
the specified sums is the objective primarily in the settlor's mind and
the possibility of income greater than the stated annuity is given little
or no consideration'in drafting the trust instrument. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, to discover many cases in which there has been no
specific provision made for the disposition of surplus income. The
general catch-all provisions frequently employed usually fail to con-
form to the requirements of the statutes relating to the creation of
trusts.
In creating the trust from which the annuity is to be derived
the settlor usually attempts to set aside a fund, the income from which
will approximately equal the desired annuity. To establish a trust
yielding the exact amount of the desired yearly annuity is an im-
possibility as a practical matter. It is not uncommon, therefore, to
find that the corpus of the trust yields an income not only sufficient
but greater than the stated annuity. The attempts either by direction
in the trust instrument or by action on the part of the trustee to
accumulate these surplus amounts and add them to the corpus to pass
to the remaindermen or to hold the surplus amounts as a reserve
against unforeseen contingencies that might reduce the trust income
at a future date have given the courts frequent opportunity to con-
sider the nature of this surplus income and statutory limitations on
its disposition. It is also interesting to note that a similar problem
arises in discretionary trusts where the trustee is given discretion as
to the amount to be applied to the use of the cestui. This latter type
of trust will be considered later in this note.
If the trust instrument contains a provision giving the surplus
income each year to third parties there is no problem for the trustee
is bound by such a direction. Where, however, the trustee is in-
structed to accumulate the surplus income there arises a question
ICochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971 (1894).
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concerning the legality of the direction to accumulate. Under the
New York statutes an accumulation is permitted only during the
minorities of persons for whose benefit the accumulation is made,
except in the case of certain charitable institutions not important
here.2 Where a valid direction to accumulate is made the fund, since
it does not become a part of the corpus of the trust during the process
of accumulation, will not pass with the corpus to the remainderman.
Should the beneficiary of the accumulation die before distribution is
to be made the amounts accumulated will become a part of the estate
of the beneficiary because the ownership of the amounts accumulated
vests immediately in the beneficiary although the possession and en-
joyment is deferred.3 If the provision for accumulation expressly
directs that the amounts accumulated will be added to the corpus of
the trust and pass to the remainderman such a provision will be void
in spite of the fact that the accumulation is directed only during the
minority of the cestui que trust.4 It is obvious that in such cases the
accumulation is not made for the benefit of the person whose minor-
ity measures the period of accumulation. In Pray v. Hegeman 5 the
trust provided for payment of a specific annuity during the minority
of the life beneficiary with a direction to accumulate any surplus in-
come and add it to the corpus of the trust. On reaching majority
the beneficiary was to be entitled to the entire income from the trust
including that from the capitalized accumulations. It was argued that
where the beneficiary during whose minority an accumulation was
directed would benefit from the capitalization of the accumulated
amounts by the receipt of an increased income after reaching majority
such accumulation was for the benefit of the person whose minority
measured the period of accumulation and, therefore, did not violate
the statute. It was held, however, that the statute requires that the
accumulation must be made for the sole benefit of the minor and in
spite of an increased income after majority the accumulation could
not be considered as made for his sole benefit since the ultimate re-
mainderman of the corpus of the trust would also profit by the capi-
talization of the accumulated amounts.
It is clear, therefore, that a direction to accumulate during the
minority of the cestui will be void if coupled with a direction to capi-
talize the amounts accumulated, unless, of course, the corpus of the
trust will pass to the cestui upon reaching majority.6 If the cestui
be an adult at the commencement of the trust it is obvious that there
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 61; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16.
3 Smith v. Parsons, 146 N. Y. 116, 40 N. E. 736 (1895) ; see Morris v.
Morris, 272 N. Y. 110, 120, 5 N. E. 2d 56, 60 (1936); Matter of Ziegler, 82
Misc. 10, 14, 143 N. Y. Supp. 682, 684 (Surr. Ct. 1913).4 Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508 (1883); cf. Barbour v. DeForest, 95
N. Y. 13 (1884).
5 92 N. Y. 508 (1883).
6 Matter of Gordon, 181 Misc. 536, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (Surr. Ct. 1943);
Matter of Sewell, 127 Misc. 202, 216 N. Y. Supp. 331 (Surr. Ct. 1926) ; Matter
of Ellen King, 121 Misc. 298, 200 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
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is no period during which the accumulation could be made since "The
statute does not permit an accumulation of the rents and profits of
land, or the income of personal property for the benefit of adults for
any period of time, however short." 7
In many cases the trust instrument contains no provision for the
disposition of surplus income. While there are conflicting author-
ities elsewhere 8 the rule in New York is well settled that where there
is nothing to indicate a contrary disposition of surplus income the
law will imply a direction to accumulate. 9 Such implied direction,
however, is as much within the prohibition of the statute as those
expressly made and to be given effect must meet the same conditions.10
Thus where the implied direction to accumulate would be for the
benefit of a remainderman other than a minor or where it would be
for a period not measured by a minority the implied direction will
be void.11 It follows that if a trust be created from which an annuity
is to be paid and no disposition is made of the surplus income the
implied direction is void where the remainder is to pass to one other
than the annuitant. Where the annuitant is also the remainderman
of the trust, it is probable, however, that if he is a minor at the crea-
tion of the trust and the trust is to continue beyond his majority the
implied direction to accumulate would be effective until he reached
his majority, whereupon he would be entitled to the accumulated
amounts whether or not, by the terms of the instrument, he was
entitled to the corpus of the trust at that time.12
A problem frequently arises where the corpus of the trust is so
constituted that the income fluctuates greatly from year to year so
that there may be an income greatly in excess of that required for
the annuity in one year, while the next year there may be a deficit.
13
7 See Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508, 515 (18 3 .8 New Haven Bank v. Hubinger, 117 Conn. 417, 167 Atl. 914 (1933);
Sandford v. Blake, 45 N. J. Eq. 248, 17 Atl. 812 (1889) (no direction implied) ;
Perry v. Brown, 34 R. . 203, 83 Atl. 8 (1912) (direction implied). See
Note, 157 A. L. R. 668, 673 (1945).9 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516 35 N. E. 971 (1894); Gilman v.
Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9 (1861) ; Matter o? Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 101 N. Y.
Supp. 557 (1st Dep't 1906).10 Phelps' Executor v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69 (1861).
11 N. Y. RwAL PRop. LAW § 61; N. Y. Pans. Pnop. LAW § 16.22Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. 322 (1857) ; Matter of Gordon, 181 Misc.
536, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (Surr. Ct. 1943); Matter of Ellen King, 121 Misc.
298, 200 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
2s This situation is well illustrated by Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403,
56 N. Y. Supp. 460 (2d Dep't 1899). The settlor in that case provided for the
payment of a specific annuity to his wife. For five or six years the income
was not only sufficient to pay the annuity but also great enough to create an
annual surplus of approximately $5,000. For two years thereafter, however,
the net income was insufficient to pay the widow's annuity. In subsequent years
when the income again increased over that necessary to pay the annuity, the
wife sued to recover the deficiencies and to require the trustee to set aside a
fund to insure the payment of the entire annuity in future years. The widow
was permitted to recover the deficiencies of past years but the court refused
1947]
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In such situations it would accomplish the primary intent of the tes-
tator more fully if the trustee were permitted to retain the surplus
income from a good year as a fund against possible future deficiencies.
The objection raised is, of course, that such retention, as a fund
against possible future deficiencies, would constitute an invalid ac-
cumulation. The courts have found such a retention to be in contra-
vention of the statute 14 although they have permitted the cestui to
recover past deficiencies out of subsequent surplus earnings where
the intent of the testator was interpreted as giving the cestui an
amount equal to the multiple of the yearly annuity by the number of
years the trust is in operation.' 5 To permit the retention of a fund
against future deficiencies where the annuitant is an adult would ren-
der that portion of the income from the trust unemployable and would
therefore constitute an accumulation during a period not necessarily
measured by the minority permitted by the statute. Until a deficit
occurred or the trust was terminated the income would be immo-
bilized. Under any other view where the trust was terminated any
amount remaining in the hands of the trustee would pass to the re-
mainderman which would in effect permit an accumulation not for the
benefit of the person whose minority measured the period of accumu-
lation. Even if the cestui were a minor, if the deficit occurred prior
to termination, the accumulation under the contrary view, although
made for the benefit of the minor-cestui, would not necessarily be
measured by his minority. The statute itself is sufficiently compre-
hensive in terms to justify the inclusion of the situation under dis-
cussion and in view of the underlying statutory policy of avoiding
the unduly prolonged immobilization of capital, the statute should be
applied to cover the situation.
The rule prohibiting such accumulations against future defi-
ciencies does not apply to the retention of funds by the trustee to pay
foreseeable expenses, bound to arise although not currently due.16
to permit the trustee to retain any part of the surplus income for the purpose
of making good any deficiency which might thereafter arise. In refusing to
permit the retention the court stated, "The learned counsel for the widow con-
tends that the principle of the cases cited, that the surplus of one year can be
applied to the deficiency of a preceding year, logically requires or justfies the
retenton of such surplus as security against deficiencies that may occur in the
future. If the right to retain the surplus depends solely on the will of the
testator, we are not prepared to deny the correctness of this proposition, at
least within limits. But we are here met with the statutory law of this state
on the subject of accumulations. All directions for accumulations of rents and
profits of real property are void, except during the minority of an infant and
for his benefit."
14 Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403, 56 N. Y. Supp. 460 (2d Dep't
1899); Grant v. Grant, 3 Redf. 283 (N. Y. 1878); see Phelps' Executor v.
Pond, 23 N. Y. 69, 82 (1861)..
15 Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403, 56 N. Y. Supp. 460 (2d Dep't
1899).
16 See Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403, 410, 56 N. Y. Supp. 460, 463
(2d Dep't 1899). "We assume that there is a limit beyond which the doctrine
forbidding accumulations cannot be carried. We do not suppose that the very
[ VOL. 22
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Such expenses, however, are administrative expenses and rightly
should be deducted from the gross income of the trust before com-
puting the net income and so as a practical matter do not constitute
the retention of funds out of earned income. The courts have often
spoken of the reasonableness of the fund retained by the trustee and
it must be remembered that the reference in such cases is to a fund
to pay the expenses of administration, such as rents, repairs, taxes,
etc., and not a fund to protect the cestui against a possible diminution
of income.
The objection that retention of a part of the income as a fund
against future deficiencies constitutes an accumulation, while accepted
by the courts, and while valid, is not the logical reason for refusing
to permit the trustee to retain funds for that purpose. Where the
settlor has provided for the disposition of the surplus income there
can be no fund retained to guard against future deficiencies and as
a protection to the annuitant since it would violate the express direc-
tion of the settlor for the disposition of the income. Where there has
been no express disposition of the surplus income the law implies a
direction to accumulate, which will be given effect so far as valid, and
any excess accumulation will be disposed of as provided by the
statute.17 It is clear, therefore, that out of the yearly earnings there
will be no amount remaining out of which a fund to pay future defi-
ciencies could be accumulated either because the settlor has expressly
disposed of the entire income for that year or because the law, in the
absence of express provision on the part of the settlor, has made dis-
position of the entire income. The only possible situation, therefore,
in which the question could arise as to whether or not the retention
of a fund against future deficiencies would constitute an invalid ac-
cumulation would be where the settlor has made express provision
for such a fund. Even in such cases the courts have found the di-
rection void,18 and have not considered the question of the reason-
day income is received it must be paid over to, or distributed among, the bene-
ficiaries, and that no amount can be retained for any time, however short, with
which to pay a charge certain to accrue in the immediate future In this city
taxes are payable toward the end of the year and they always equal a large
portion of the rent of real estate. Any prudent trustee would retain a certain
part of the income received during the early portion of the year to meet the
charge that was sure to come at its end. The same is true of repairs; the cost
of a repair which it was reasonably certain would become necessary in a short
time might well be apportioned over some period of time as depreciation -of
the property, and a fund might be accumulated to defray the cost when it
would be incurred. Some discretion must be left to the trustee in such mat-
ters, and his action, fairly taken in good faith in the retention of rents for
the purposes indicated, would not be held to create accumulations against the
statute!'; accord, Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971 (1894);
Eberley's Appeal, 110 Pa. 95, 1 Atl. 330 (1885); In re Mathues' Estate, 322
Pa. 358, 185 At. 768 (1936); Tucker v. Binenstock, 310 Pa. 254, 165 Atl. 247(1933).
17 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 63.
is Grant v. Grant, 3 Redf. 283 (N. Y. 1878).
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ableness of the amounts retained. The validity or invalidity of a pro-
vision in the trust instrument is to be determined from the terms of
the instrument and not from the result of the administration of the
trust. If the retention of a fund of $100,000 as a safeguard against
possible deficiencies is void, so too will the retention of a fund of
$1.00 be void if made in accordance with the same direction. While
there is language in some of the cases which might lead one on a
hasty reading to believe that even where express provision has been
made for an accumulation the courts will permit the trustee to retain
funds as a matter of judicious administration of the trust,' 9 a careful
examination will disclose that the direction is controlled by the pro-
visions of the statute and provision for future deficiencies no matter
how provident such arrangements might be in fact, will be permitted
only so long as it complies with the provisions of law. The question
of the reasonableness of the amount retained is only considered in
cases where funds are retained to defer the expenses of administra-
tion and not in cases where it is retained as a protection for the cestui.
Very often the settlor will lodge in the trustee discretion as to
the amount, the time or the manner of disposition of the income of
the trust without specifying any exact amount to be given the cestui.
The situations arising under the trusts in which the trustee has dis-
cretion as to the amount to be applied for the benefit of the cestui are
similar to those in which a specific amount is named by the settlor.
If there is an express provision disposing of the income not paid out
by the trustee such provision is binding. If there is a pirovision order-
ing the trustee to accumulate any surplus and add it to the principal
such direction is void unless the accumulation is made during the
minority of the cestui and the corpus pass to him upon reaching
majority.20
Thus where there is a clear discretion given the trustee as to
amount when that amount is once determined the surplus income must
be distributed as though the amount applied by the trustee was an
annuity specified by the settlor. Although the duty to accumulate is
contingent since the existence of a surplus depends upon the discre-
tion of the trustee it is, none the less, within the statute and to be
valid must satisfy the requirements as to the period of accumulation
and the persons benefited.2 1
As in the case involving a trust to pay an annuity, it frequently
appears in discretionary trusts that the possibility of surplus income
19 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971 (1894); Hill v. Guar-
anty Trust Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1914);
Matter of Bavier. No. 1, 164 App. Div. 358,. 149 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't
1914).2 0 Hawthorne v. Smith, 273 N. Y. 291, 7 N. E. 2d 139 (1937) ; Morris v.
Morris, 272 N. Y. 110, 5 N. E. 2d 56 (1936); Barbour v. DeForest, 95 N. Y.
13 (1884).21 Barbour v. DeForest, 95 N. Y. 13 (1884) ; Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y.
322 (1857).
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is completely ignored. In the absence of the expression of a contrary
intention where the settlor intends to lodge discretion in his trustee
as to the amount of income to be applied then it necessarily clothes
the trustee with authority to accumulate the residue which authority
must also conform to the statute to be valid. 22 It would follow from
this rule that where the cestui is an adult and discretion as to amount
is given the trustee the amounts not applied in any one year for the
benefit of the cestui would pass under the statute to those presump-
tively entitled to the next eventual estate.23 Or if the cestui were a
minor, the surplus income could be accumulated only if the corpus
were to pass to that minor. Even in such case, however, the implied
direction could be exercised only until the cestui reached majority.24
This rule prevents the accumulation of funds which will not neces-
sarily pass to the person whose minority measures the period of
accumulation and fulfills the policy underlying the statutory restric-
tions. The income from the trust is disposed of as received and no
fund can be retained as a protection for the primary beneficiary.
The statute thus forces the hand of the trustee in cases where
he is given discretion as to amount. He cannot lay aside a fund from
which he could draw in the future should the needs of the cestui re-
quire an amount greater than the income in any one year. The harsh-
ness of this result has not escaped the courts. They have come to
examine closely the language of the trust instrument and are slow to
find that the settlor intended to benefit the ultimate remainderman
at the expense of the primary beneficiary of the trust. Therefore, to
permit a finding that the settlor intended to give the trustee discretion
as to the amount to be applied such intention must be clearly
expressed.25
The importance of the type of discretion given the trustee appears
to have escaped many draftsmen of trust instruments. Indeed, thd
courts themselves have not, in many cases, clearly expressed the dis-
tinction between a discretion as to amount, and discretion as to the
time and manner of application, although they have often made it
the controlling factor in determining the validity of accumulations or
the disposition of surplus income.2 6 The importance of this distinc-
tion is as fundamental as the policy underlying the restriction of ac-
cumulations or the entire statutory scheme regulating perpetuities.
22 Matter of Hoyt, 116 ApR. Div. 217, 101 N. Y. Supp. 557 (Ist Dep't
906).23 N. Y. REA PROP. LAW § 63.2 4 Matter of Gordon, 181 Misc. 536, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (Surr. Ct. 1943);
Matter of Ellen King, 121 Misc. 298, 200 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
25 An illegal disposition of property by will is not presumed. DuBois v.
Ray, 35 N. Y. 162 (1866); Hopkins v. Kent, 145 N. Y. 363, 40 N. E. 4 (1895);
Matter of Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 101 N. Y. Supp. 557 (Ist Dep't 1906).26 Bloodgood v. Lewis, 209 N. Y. 95, 102 N. E. 610 (1913), reversing 146
App. Div. 86, 130 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1st Dep't 1911). The testator gave each of
his children one-fourth of the income from a trust created by the will. One
of the daughters, Mary, was incompetent at the time the will was made and
1947 ]
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The corpus of a trust remains subject to the provisions of the
trust until its termination. The income before accrual is inalienable
by statute 27 although once accrued may be disposed of. Such re-
straint upon the power of alienation is permitted to satisfy the rea-
sonable desires of persons who wish to provide support or mainte-
nance for others without subjecting the funds allotted to such a pur-
pose to the risk of dissipation at the hands of the very objects of
their bounty. The purpose to be accomplished in such a case out-
weighs the importance of the social and economic policy which de-
mands that property remain free from unreasonable restraints and
burdens. A trust to accumulate goes one step further than the ordi-
nary trust and permits the income from a fund to be fettered with
restrictions and restraints upon its alienation even after the income
has been collected by the trustee. Consequently, the restraint imposed
by an accumulation is greater than the restraint imposed by an ordi-
nary trust and the law has permitted an accumulation only in those
cases where the age of the beneficiary prevents him from managing
his own affairs.28  Thus the underlying policy of the statute restrict-
ing the periods and beneficiaries of accumulations must first be sat-
isfied before the will or intent of the settlor can be given effect.
Where the trustee is given discretion as to the amount of the
income to be applied to the cestui and no disposition of surplus income
is made, we have seen that the law implies a direction to accumulate. 29
The implied direction, of necessity, will require a capitalization of the
accumulated amounts since these sums will pass with the corpus of
the trust to the remainderman30 Thus a portion of the income of the
trust will, at the discretion of the trustee, become part of the corpus
the testator provided that her share was to be paid to Rosetta, another daugh-
ter, who was to apply the income to Mary's use. Later the testator executed
a codicil to the will modifying the original will by providing that the trustees
should pay to Mary such sums, as in their discretion were necessary for her
care and support. The Appellate Division held that the codicil gave the trus-
tees discretion as to the amount to be received by Mary; that any surplus in-
come not applied to her use would be accumulated. Since the accumulation
did not fall within the statute the surplus income would pass to the persons
presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. The Court of Appeals re-
versed this decision holding that the gift to Mary was absolute, qualified only
as to the manner of payment. The intent of the testator was to give his
daughter the entire income and he did not intend, by the codicil, to vest in the
trustees absolute discretion as to the amount of income she was to receive.
"It did not empower the trustees to determine, in their discretion, what her
share of the residue income should be or how much was bequeathed to her.
It empowered them, rather, to determine, in their discretion, how much of the
one-fourth equal part bequeathed to her would be expended for her benefit,
and made them custodians and conservators of the unexpended balance . ... "
Thus the presence or absence of an implied direction to accumulate depended
solely on the intent of the testator as to the type of discretion given the
trustees.27 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103.2 8 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 61.
29 See note 20 supra.
30 Barbour v. DeForest, 95 N. Y. 13 (1884).
[ VOL. 22
NOTES AND COMMENT
not to be conveyed until the terms of the trust so direct. The income
thus disposed of becomes fettered with restraints upon its alienation
and unless the termination of the trust is so designed as to bring the
accumulation within the terms of the statute, the accumulation is void.
Such an objection, however, is not presented where the discre-
tion given the trustee is a mere discretion as to the time and manner
of application of the income.8' That is, where the intent and direc-
tion of the settlor is that the cestui receive the entire income from
the trust with the trustee determining how and when the cestui will
spend the income. In this case the income vests immediately in the
cestui and at any moment can be applied to his use. The sole re-
straint imposed rests in the discretion of the trustee whose will is
substituted for that of the cestui's. There is no restraint imposed
upon the expenditure of the income.
Technically there is no accumulation where the trustee has a mere
discretion as to the method of disposition. The entire income is dis-
posed of by the trust instrument and no part can be added to the
corpus. Nor are the persons presumptively entitled to the next even-
tual estate entitled to any portion of the income.3 2 Where the cestui
dies before the entire income has been applied to his use the sums re-
maining in the hands of the trustee pass to the cestui's estate. Any
amount may be retained by the trustee subject only to the control of
the court in instances of abuse of discretion. Neither the amount nor
the length of time are important considerations in determining the
power of the trustee to withhold a portion of the income. The sole
question to be considered in cases where such action on the part of
the trustee is questioned is the intent of the testator or settlor. If his
intention was to give the cestui the entire income subject to the dis-
cretion of the trustee as to the time and manner of disposition of the
income there can be no question of the validity of an accumulation
since the trust in such cases neither expressly nor impliedly provides
for an accumulation.
3 3
In Hill v. Guaranty Trust Company 3 4 the fact that virtually the
entire income of a trust had for many years remained in the hands
of the trustee who had been able to expend only a limited amount of
the income due to the incarceration of the cestui, first in a prison and
then in an insane asylum, was held of no importance since the income
as received vested in the cestui and only the time and manner of dis-
3 1 Bloodgood v. Lewis, 209 N. Y. 95, 102 N. E. 610 (1913), reversing 146
App. Div. 86, 130 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1st Dep't 1911); Hill v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1914); Hendricks v.
Hendricks, 3 App. Div. 604, 38 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1896).
32 Hill v. Guaranty Trust Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N. Y. Supp. 601
(1st Dep't 1914).
33 Curtis v. Curtis, 184 App. Div. 274, 171 N. Y. Supp. 510 (1st Dep't
1918); Matter of Bavier. No. 1, 164 App. Div. 358, 149 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st
Dep't 1914) semble; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 3 App. Div. 604, 38 N. Y. Supp.
402 (1st Dep't 1896).
3 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1914).
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position were left to the trustee. The entire sum retained by the
trustees passed to the estate of the cestui and the remainderman had
no interest in any of these sums.
The courts have made great efforts to give effect to the primary
intent of the settlor and in most cases have determined that the only
discretion given was as to time and manner of disposition. In Matter
of Hoyt 85 the testator created a trust empowering the trustees to
apply the entire income to the use of his daughter but also empowering
them to accumulate any income, in their discretion, not needed by
the daughter and to capitalize such amounts accumulated. The di-
rection to accumulate was held void and stricken from the will. The
court then gave effect to the provisions remaining in the will and held
the daughter entitled to the entire income, laying down the rule that
".... where the direction for an accumulation is void, and there is
some other and legal disposition of the rents and profits, the statute
does not apply;.., in such case the direction for accumulation should
be eliminated from the will." Be
Similarly in Curtis v. Curtis 3 7 where the settlor lodged discre-
tion in the trustees and provided that on the death of the cestui the
remainder and all sums accumulated by the trustees should pass to
the remainderman named, the courts held that there was no intention
to accumulate. The entire income as received passed to the cestui
and the only discretion given the trustees was as to time and manner.
The use of the word accumulation was merely an erroneous choice
of words by the settlor in an effort to designate the funds which
might remain in the hands of the trustees upon the death of the
cestui. Since the income as earned became the property of the cestui
during her life the effort made by the settlor to dispose of such
amounts received upon the death of the cestul was given no effect.38
It was no longer his property to dispose of.
It is clear from these decisions that where the courts initially
construe the discretion lodged in the trustees as a discretion as to
time and manner an attempt by the settlor also to provide for an
accumulation of a portion of the income will be stricken from the
will and effect given solely to the primary intention of the settlor.
Since the court determines first that the entire income is given the
cestui the direction disposing of any remaining portion is mere sur-
plusage. The settlor makes a gift of such income to the cestui and
cannot, by a further provision in the will, control the disposition upon
the death of the cestui of such income as was already earned.
85Matter of Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 101 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1st Dep't
1906).
s8 Accord, Hawthorne v. Smith, 273 N. Y. 291, 7 N. E. 2d 139 (1937);
Morris v. Morris, 272 N. Y. 110, 5 N. E. 2d 56 (1936); see Cochrane v.
Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971 (1894).
S 184 App. Div. 274, 171 N. Y. Supp. 510 (1st Dep't 1918).
38 Cf. Hawthorne v. Smith, 273 N. Y. 291, 7 N. E. 2d 139 (1937).
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NOTES AND COMMENT
While these latter cases present situations where income from a
trust can be validly retained by the trustee for long periods of time,
the general statutory prohibitions against accumulations remain in
full vigor. The policy behind the statutes must always be considered.
Whether an annuity be specified or the amount be discretionary, the
trustee will be prohibited from tying up income either by way of capi-
talization or by the creation of reserve funds. The fact that the ac-
cumulations arise incident to the administration of the trust and are
in no way connected with the main purpose of the trust will not save
them from the stigma of illegality. The language of the statute is
broad and will be broadly construed by the courts to give full effect
to the statutory policy.
GEORGE F. MASON, JR.
NEw YORK CvL PRACTICE ACT; SEccroN 235, 1946 VERsION
-DoEs IT ENLARGE CouRT's JURISDICTION?
The concept of jurisdiction is an inherent part of the judicial
process. One view that might be taken of jurisdiction as existent in
American jurisprudence is that it is a limitation upon the power of
the court, imposed by the individual. As the residuary of all power,
he guaranteed to himself reasonable notice of complaint and oppor-
tunity to defend, and required that the summoning judicial tribunal
should have authoritative power over the person of a defendant, or
over the property or res toward which the litigation is directed. Such
guarantee is perpetuated by the due process requirement in the Fed-
eral Constitution.'
Justice Holmes, speaking in McDonald v. Mabee,2 notes that
the "foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." 3 Violent body
arrest, however, is rarely resorted to today for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It is sufficient for
the acquisition of jurisdiction that the defendant is within the physi-
cal borders of the state when served.
But there is a more refined power that exists in a political sov-
ereignty over its citizens, residents and domiciliaries. It is a power
that survives a temporary inability to reduce a defendant to bodily
custody. It is a power in the state, and a duty in the person, ex-
plicable and justifiable in view of the privileges afforded the person
by virtue of his status in the state. Upon satisfactory notice of suit,
U. S. Co sT. Amwms. V, XIV.
2 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608 (1917).
3 Id. at 91.
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